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INTRODUCTION
Virtually everyone who has engaged in choice-of-law scholarship has had
unflattering things said about him or her, and every scholar’s favorite
methodology has come under attack. Given the reputation of the First
Restatement of Conflicts of Laws,1 it should come as little surprise that Joseph
Beale, its drafter, “has been the target of ridicule by practically every conflicts

* Stanford Law Fellow, Stanford Law School. The author would like to thank Norman
Spaulding, Larry Kramer, Paul Berman, John Greenman, Brooke Coleman, and Nirej
Sekhon for their insights and support.
1. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934). Conflicts of Law is a broad
field that encompasses choice of law and other areas. However, choice-of-law scholars often
use “conflicts” and “choice of law” interchangeably, and I do so as well in this Book
Review.
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writer in the last four decades,”2 or that the First Restatement itself “has been
the favorite punching bag of every conflicts teacher.”3 But the scholars who
succeeded Beale and pioneered the modern approaches have fared no better,
and neither have their theories. William Prosser memorably referred to
conflicts scholars as “learned but eccentric professors who theorize about
mysterious matters in a strange and incomprehensible jargon.”4 Prosser’s
assessment is charitable compared to that of Lea Brillmayer, who has described
them as “a wild-eyed community of intellectual zealots.”5 Meanwhile, the
modern doctrinal approaches have yielded “gibberish”6 and “confused and
misguided thinking.”7 In short, modern conflicts theory and doctrine is a
mess—a “debacle,” according to one scholar8—and there is no real consensus
on how to clean it up.
It is time for a new treatment of conflicts, one that does not approach it
either through high-minded theory or as a set of convoluted law school exam
fact patterns. What the field really needs is empirical inquiry: what has the
revolution in choice of law wrought, and what can we learn from that?9
Intrepid researchers have undertaken this task in fits and starts over the past
fifteen years or so,10 and the conflicts giant Dean Symeon Symeonides has
been at the forefront of the project.11 His highly anticipated and ambitious new
book, The American Choice-of-Law Revolution: Past, Present and Future, is
the pinnacle of his efforts and aims to be the authoritative word on the impact
of the revolution. First delivered as a series of lectures at The Hague Academy
of International Law in 2002 and now widely available for the first time, it
should be required reading for anyone engaging in conflicts scholarship.

2. Symeon C. Symeonides, The First Conflicts Restatement Through the Eyes of Old:
As Bad as Its Reputation?, 32 S. ILL. U. L.J. (forthcoming 2007) (manuscript at 2), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=963267.
3. Id.
4. William L. Prosser, Interstate Publication, 51 MICH. L. REV. 959, 971 (1953).
5. LEA BRILMAYER, CONFLICT OF LAWS: FOUNDATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS, at xiii
(1991).
6. Friedrich K. Juenger, A Third Conflicts Restatement?, 75 IND. L.J. 403, 403 (2000).
7. Larry Kramer, On the Need for a Uniform Choice of Law Code, 89 MICH. L. REV.
2134, 2149 (1991).
8. William L. Reynolds, Legal Process and Choice of Law, 56 MD. L. REV. 1371, 1371
n.5 (1997).
9. See, e.g., Patrick J. Borchers, Empiricism and Theory in Conflicts Law, 75 IND. L.J.
509, 509-10 (2000) (arguing for more empirical work in the field and consideration of how
empiricism and theory should interact); William M. Richman & William L. Reynolds,
Prologomenon to an Empirical Restatement of Conflicts, 75 IND. L.J. 417, 434-35 (2000)
(calling for further empirical studies).
10. See Richman & Reynolds, supra note 9, at 426-33 (reviewing the empirical
studies).
11. See id.
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At its best, Revolution offers the finest, most rigorous account of conflicts
doctrine as it functions in the courts, as well as a penetrating and thoughtful
analysis on how the doctrine should evolve. The overarching normative point,
based on thorough empirical analysis, is that the American conflicts experiment
has moved radically from too rigid and arbitrary “rules” to too flexible
“approaches” (pp. 423-37). Symeonides argues that the modern day flexibility
is far preferable to the old system’s rigidity,12 but he contends that it is time to
find a middle ground, one that provides firmer guidance for judges and lawyers
while still respecting the insights of the choice-of-law revolution and
maintaining its flexibility (p. 425).
Unfortunately, though it pushes the field in the right direction,
Symeonides’s account does not go far enough. Putting aside the question of
whether balance between rigidity and flexibility can ever be achieved,13
Revolution defines its terms too narrowly. It is simply not enough to develop a
view of the revolution by reading only published cases, which has been the
orthodox approach since the start of the revolution, but which reflects and
encourages an unhealthy and unproductive disengagement from legal practice.
Instead, the full impact of the choice-of-law revolution can only be judged
by careful analysis of the view from the bottom, from the standpoint of busy
trial court judges, lawyers, litigants, and potential litigants. And that story
would in all likelihood be quite different from the story Symeonides tells.
Indeed, if we were to engage practice in a serious way, we may find that the
modern approaches, instead of introducing fairness and rationality into the
doctrine, have introduced a new set of costs and a different kind of
arbitrariness. Whatever the gains in rationality brought by the revolution, they
may be trumped by the price of uncertainty.
Thus, Revolution is exemplary within both meanings of the word:14 it is the
best example of conflicts scholarship, but it also demonstrates by example what
is missing from the field, namely serious consideration of the practical
consequences of legal theory.
This Book Review proceeds as follows. In Part I, I briefly review the
history of the revolution. Here, my goals are limited; I aim only to put
Symeonides’s project into historical focus and to provide a primer for the
uninitiated. Part II reviews Revolution’s structure, methodologies, and findings,
and considers its contributions to conflicts scholarship more broadly.

12. P. 423 (“[F]lexibility is preferable to uncritical rigidity . . . .”).
13. Symeonides himself notes that there is no such thing as perfect choice-of-law rules
(p. 346), and I have my own doubts about how flexibility and predictability can ever come to
terms with one another.
14. “Exemplary” can mean both “worthy of imitation” and also “typical.”

250

STANFORD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60:247

Part III is the core of my critique. In it, I discuss Revolution’s primary
shortcomings and argue that, as a result of its limitations, Revolution is simply
too removed from the practicalities of actual litigation and too theoretical to
serve as a touchstone for the development of the law. I first cast doubt on
Symeonides’s empirical findings because of his flawed data set and
methodology. I also argue that by ignoring the impact of the revolution on the
process of litigation, Symeonides effectively captures only part of it—and
perhaps a less important part, at that. Finally, I conclude by briefly discussing
how scholarship in the field should develop in order to respond to these
weaknesses and by laying out a course of analysis and research through which
scholarship and practice can meaningfully reengage one another.
I. THE REVOLUTION
The past fifty years have witnessed a dramatic change in American
conflicts scholarship and doctrine (pp. 9-121),15 particularly in the tort context
(p. 123).
Once, in what have become known as the bad old days, courts followed the
First Restatement when deciding choice-of-law issues (pp. 10-11). The First
Restatement provided fairly strict rules about which state’s law should govern
any case (id.).16 In the tort context, with some important exceptions, the
substantive law of the jurisdiction in which an injury took place governed the
lawsuit.17 For example, if a resident of California collided with a resident of
New York on a freeway in Michigan, Michigan law would apply, and no
further analysis would be necessary.
Beginning in as early as the 1920s, legal realists took aim at the First
Restatement’s rigidity, formalism, and arbitrariness (pp. 11-35). They argued
that sometimes the state in which an injury occurs has no interest in a lawsuit,
and some other state has manifestly greater interest (pp. 12-13). They claimed,
in classic realist terms, that the formalistic rules of the First Restatement were
irrational and unjust (pp. 12-24).18 And they maintained that the apparently
strict rules of the First Restatement actually contained so many escape hatches
that judges could effectively do whatever they wanted (p. 26), leading to
arbitrary results. Although these views gained little traction in courts at first,
and although the doctrinal prescriptions of these early critics have never

15. See also LEA BRILLMAYER, supra note 5, at 22-36; R. CRAMTON, D. CURRIE & H.
KAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS 1-135 (4th ed. 1987); D. SIEGEL, CONFLICTS IN A NUTSHELL 202-07,
242-69 (1982).
16. See also RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934).
17. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 378 (1934).
18. See, e.g., David F. Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 HARV. L.
REV. 173 (1933).
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enjoyed much support (pp. 11-13), their driving concerns about rationality,
justice, and flexibility set the stage for the revolution to come.
In the 1960s, Professor Brainerd Currie eloquently expanded the critique
and provided a new framework for approaching choice-of-law questions (pp.
13-22). His central innovation, the state interest analysis, became the basis for
virtually every proposed doctrine that followed (pp. 22-24). Under his
approach, for example, if State Z has laws that protect manufacturers, then it
has a strong interest in having its law applied to manufacturers that operate
within its borders, whereas it has no interest in protecting manufacturers that
operate in other states. Therefore, if an injury occurs in State Z, an out-of-state
manufacturer should not automatically be entitled to the application and
protections of State Z’s law.
Currie and his followers maintained that a flexible, case-by-case approach
to choice-of-law problems that focused on state interests would be the most
rational and fair. Although Currie’s specific doctrinal recommendations have
not been implemented in very many jurisdictions, his vision continues to
dominate the academic debate today (pp. 22-24). Indeed, when we refer to the
“choice-of-law revolution” we speak primarily of the introduction of state
interest analysis and the rejection of “rules” in favor of “approaches.”
Predictably, scholars began to debate Currie’s approach in earnest, with
each offering another twist, a new approach, or a different analysis (pp. 24-25).
Not so predictably, this academic discourse actually had an almost immediate
impact on judicial doctrine (pp. 37-62). Indeed, perhaps more so than in any
other field of law, courts have taken their doctrinal cues in conflicts cases
directly from legal scholars.19 Beginning tentatively in the 1960s, and then in
earnestness in the 1970s and the 1980s, courts began to reject the First
Restatement and to adopt the modern approaches instead (pp. 37-43).
Today, the most common approach to choice-of-law problems is provided
by the Second Restatement (p. 88), which is really a mixture of many other
modern approaches, and a fairly meaningless mixture at that,20 though other
jurisdictions have adopted other modern and flexible approaches (pp. 48, 65).
Either way, many contemporary scholars agree that, in practice, the various
doctrinal approaches do not provide much guidance for, or constraints on,
judges at all.21 So the story is mixed: legal scholars have succeeded in

19. P. 9 (“[C]hoice-of-law . . . is one of the few branches of American law that has
been heavily influenced by scholastic writings.”); see Earl M. Maltz, Do Modern Theories of
Conflict of Laws Work? The New Jersey Experience, 36 RUTGERS L.J. 527, 527 (2005)
(“[L]egal scholars have probably had more influence of the judicial treatment of choice-oflaw problems than in any other area of the law.”).
20. See Reynolds, supra note 8, at 1385-89.
21. According to Larry Kramer, “[I]t hardly comes as news that the Second
Restatement is flawed. But one needs to read a lot of opinions in a single sitting fully to
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overturning an arbitrary but fairly (or at least potentially) predictable regime
with a supposedly more rational, though apparently indecipherable, one.
This is where Symeonides comes in. His is an effort to extrapolate hidden
patterns and silent rules for how judges actually decide conflicts questions, to
assess those patterns and rules, and to shape the discourse on the basis of that
assessment.
II. HIDDEN PATTERNS TODAY AND A RETURN TO RULISM TOMORROW?
Revolution is both an introduction for the foreign student to contemporary
American conflicts doctrine and a serious empirical and normative commentary
on the doctrine. As such, it occupies a middle space between a basic text and an
academic tome, addressed equally to the beginner and the specialist.
Surprisingly, it occupies that space quite comfortably, serving both audiences
well.
Revolution succeeds in reaching its first audience, the foreigner unfamiliar
with the common law and federalist traditions,22 by virtue of Symeonides’s
patience in explaining core concepts, his easy, uncluttered, and engaging style
and clear organization, and his use of easily interpreted tables, charts, and
diagrams.23 Yet, despite his care for the novice, the apparent straight talk belies
a deep and rich critical discourse on the law.
Symeonides begins his empirical story by carefully explaining the basic
contours of the various modern conflicts theories that the revolution produced
(pp. 9-121). As I have said, the competing theories do share some important
features, including the flexibility they encourage and the state interest analysis
they require (pp. 22-24, 71-72). Still, while these similarities are important, the
fact that scholars endlessly debate the relative merits of each alternative
approach must indicate that the methodologies should yield differing results, at
least in some measurable range of cases. After all, what would be the use of
quibbling over doctrine if the end results were the same?

appreciate just how badly the Second Restatement works in practice.” Larry Kramer, Choice
of Law in the American Courts in 1990: Trends and Developments, 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 465,
486-87 (1991).
22. The book is addressed to this audience for two reasons. First, Symeonides
remembers his own days as a “foreign observer” and an “outsider” confronting a choice-oflaw system that was “alien in both language and logic,” and foreign students therefore have a
special place in his heart (p. vii). Second, Revolution is based on a series of lectures initially
delivered at the Hague Academy of International Law, and so foreign students and scholars
were, quite literally, the audience (p. vii-viii).
23. See, e.g., pp. 39, 40, 44, 48-49, 50, 51, 151, 170, 177, 195, 213, 234. This list
simply provides examples of the many useful tables, charts, and diagrams in Revolution. It is
by no means complete.
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It is therefore surprising—or perhaps unsurprising, depending on where
one finds oneself on the formalist/realist/crit spectrum—that Symeonides,
drawing on his own prior empirical work and that of others, declares that
“methodology rarely drives judicial decisions” (p. 70). In other words, it simply
does not matter which methodology or theory a court adopts; the result will be
driven by the judge’s preference.24 As Symeonides puts it, “[O]f all the factors
that may affect the outcome of a conflicts case, the factor that is the most
inconsequential is the choice-of-law methodology followed by the court.”25
In various places throughout the book, Symeonides suggests two related
reasons for this dynamic. First, it may be due to the flexibility and
indeterminacy inherent in the approaches themselves, which do not constrict
the choice-of-law analysis in particularly meaningful or effective ways (pp. 9192).26 For example, the Second Restatement, which has been adopted by at
least twenty-two jurisdictions for conflicts in tort cases (pp. 48, 65), provides a
“deliberately malleable list” of relevant factors for a judge to consider (p. 92).
To be precise, there are two lists, one that provides seven “principles,”27 and
another that enumerates the four relevant “contacts.”28 It is difficult to imagine
that mathematics of this sort could provide any “right” answer.
Second, Symeonides suggests that, perhaps as a result of this lack of clear
guidance, judges (and presumably the attorneys upon whose briefs the judges

24. See also Stewart E. Sterk, The Marginal Relevance of Choice of Law Theory, 142
U. PA. L. REV. 949, 951 (1994) (“[T]he result in the case often appears to have dictated the
judge’s choice of law approach . . . .”).
25. P. 70 (quoting Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in
1994: A View “From the Trenches,” 43 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 2 (1995)).
26. See also In re Paris Air Crash of Mar. 3, 1974, 399 F. Supp. 732, 739 (describing
choice of law as a “veritable jungle” leading to a “reign of chaos dominated . . . by the
judge’s ‘informed guess’”).
27. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(2) (1971). The principles
enumerated in this section are:
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems,
(b) the relevant policies of the forum,
(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interests of those states in
the determination of the particular issue,
(d) the protection of justified expectations,
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law,
(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and
(g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied.

Id.
28. Id. § 145(2). The relevant contacts enumerated in this section are:
(a) the place where the injury occurred,
(b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred,
(c) the domicil, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the
parties, and
(d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered.

Id. Obviously the more parties there are to the case, the more the number of relevant contacts
grows.
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rely and rule) do not understand how to apply the various methodologies (p.
427). It should be less than shocking, therefore, that judges are guided by their
own intuitions more than by any particular doctrine.
This finding must make the reader pause, for it begs two questions. First, if
it does not matter which approach a court adopts—modified interest analysis
(pp. 72-74), comparative impairment (pp. 24-25, 74-75), the better-law
approach (pp. 25-28, 81-87), the Second Restatement (pp. 88-98), the
significant contacts approaches (pp. 98-101), various combined approaches (pp.
115-16), or New York’s unique rules (pp. 101-14)—and if a judge will
ultimately choose whatever law she thinks best (or throw her hands up in
exasperation and hope not to get overturned on appeal), what is the point in
choosing from among these theories in the first place? Why do courts spend so
much time and energy talking about them, if not just to provide rhetorical cover
for results-oriented decision making? This, of course, is not a new critique; it is
just the by-now-familiar (though admittedly simplified) charge leveled by
realists and crits across the board.29
But Symeonides’s finding about the relative unimportance of methodology
begs a second question as well—one that is both more specific to the conflicts
field and more uncomfortable for scholars: why should we be driving the
doctrine in the first place? If the endless theoretical and doctrinal debates are
ultimately meaningless once filtered through courts, then perhaps theorists’
energies are best directed elsewhere, and perhaps judges and policymakers
would do better looking elsewhere for doctrinal cues.
For better or worse, Symeonides, in full descriptive mode, does not address
these points head on, at least not in this part of his story. Instead, having
established that it makes little difference which methodology a court or
jurisdiction employs, he rolls them all together in order to determine how
courts across the board decide choice-of-law cases that feature similar patterns.
He begins this process by dividing tort conflicts into three categories: lossdistribution conflicts (which stem from competing “tort rules that are designed
primarily to allocate between parties the losses caused by admittedly tortious
conduct”) (pp. 123, 140-210), conduct-regulating conflicts (which stem from
“tort rules that are designed primarily to regulate conduct”) (pp. 123, 211-63),
and product-liability conflicts (pp. 123, 265-364). He has his reasons for these
distinctions,30 and, though they are controversial,31 they have a surface-level
credibility.

29. For an engaging account of the realists and their critique, see LAURA KALMAN,
LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, 1927-1960 (2001). For an account of critical legal studies, see
MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES (1987).
30. Theoretically, at least, the state in which the injury occurs is most interested in
those tort rules that regulate conduct, whereas it is less interested in those rules that seek to
allocate losses (pp. 123-40). Symeonides offers product liability cases as a separate category
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Having created these three categories, he then gets into the dirty and
difficult work of dividing the hundreds of cases that he has reviewed among the
categories and subdividing them further by their patterns. So, for example, he
finds fifty loss-distributing common-domicile conflicts (cases in which both
parties to a tort reside in one jurisdiction, but the tort occurs in another) from
among all of the United States jurisdictions. In forty-four of these cases, the
courts applied the law of the common domicile rather than that of the site of the
injury (pp. 145-59). He continues this process for every imaginable conflict
pattern among the three categories of cases and extrapolates unstated rules that
guide the cases (pp. 145-364). He presents his findings with marvelous clarity,
which, standing alone, is a gift to anyone who grapples with conflicts theory.
To lay plain what courts actually do with the doctrine is an enormous
achievement, for it demystifies a complex doctrinal area and provides actual
guidance for scholar, judge, and practitioner alike.
After presenting the results of his painstaking study, Symeonides moves in
a normative direction. He suggests that although the flexibility, nuance, and
individuality of the modern approach is preferable to the rigidity and
dogmatism of the First Restatement, the revolution has led to unfortunate
excesses, chief among them excessive flexibility and unpredictability (pp. 42337). As he says late in the book, “In the United States, the movement of
conflicts law from certainty to flexibility has been impulsive, rash, and
wholesale . . . . [A]ll [of the modern] approaches are open-ended and call for an
individualized, ad hoc handling of each case” (pp. 412-13). He argues that we
have gone from “bad rules” to “no rules” (p. 412) and that the next
development in the continuing evolution should be the attempt to find the
middle ground and to develop flexible rules—rules that would be both fair and
predictable. Symeonides suggests some general contours of these rules (pp.
435-37) as well as some specific examples (pp. 346-64), and it is on this note—
with the hope that smart, flexible rules are in our future (p. 437)—that the book
closes.
Revolution pushes conflicts discourse in the right direction in two crucial
respects. First, empiricism must be the starting point for conflicts scholarship.
Empiricism, of course, is enjoying its moment in the sun in every field of legal
scholarship, and for good reason. Too often, conventional wisdom,
entirely because they are uniquely complex (pp. 123, 265-66).
31. This is not the first time that Symeonides and others, including courts, have used
the loss-distribution vs. conduct-regulating method of categorization. For some
commentators, however, the distinction is too incoherent or incomplete to be useful. See,
e.g., Wendy Collins Perdue, A Reexamination of the Distinction Between “Loss-Allocating”
and “Conduct-Regulating Rules,” 60 LA. L. REV. 1251 (2000). Symeonides goes to some
lengths to defend these categories (pp. 129-140). In the end, though, I suspect that those who
agree with him are persuaded by his defense, and those who do not are not. For my part, I am
agnostic.
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conventional assumptions, and common sense are wrong, and elegant theories
miss the mark. Therefore, to comment authoritatively on the law and to make
grand, or even small, normative claims about its development requires real
knowledge about what the law actually does and what impact changes to the
law will likely have.
The need for empiricism in legal scholarship is probably even more
important in a relatively obscure field like conflicts than it is in other areas.
Unlike in many substantive fields, in conflicts, few other than legal scholars are
even likely to know that the field exists, and no one—neither the legislature,
nor other academic disciplines, nor public policy organizations—is likely to
notice changes in the law or challenge them. The lack of countervailing forces
has given legal scholars unusual power to shape the law;32 and when the very
first finding of an empirical review is that the dueling theories that scholars
propose and courts adopt are actually put to use no differently from one
another,33 well, let us just say that the case is settled that choice of law should
go nowhere without further empirical study.
Second, and as important, Symeonides’s normative argument in favor of
rules is welcome. He is not, of course, the first to suggest that unchecked
flexibility is undesirable, but he makes the case more persuasively than most,
and, flowing as it does from his empirical findings, it is likely to gain some
traction. Others will have more to say about Symeonides’s specific doctrinal
recommendations than I do, but if the debate in conflicts scholarship centers
itself on which rules to adopt, as opposed to which approaches, then
Symeonides’s contribution will be lasting indeed.34
III. THE REST OF THE REVOLUTION’S STORY
The central problem with Revolution is that the data set is problematic. I
mean this first in the narrowest sense: to the extent Symeonides seeks to
describe what goes on in courts, his collection of cases is too restricted to be
revealing. But there is also a broader difficulty with his data set: even if it were
representative, it still would not tell us what we need to know about the impact
of the revolution in order to evaluate the revolution. Simply put, an empirical
assessment of the choice-of-law experience cannot rest on judicial opinions
alone. The story of the revolution lies not only, or even primarily, in what

32. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
33. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
34. Interestingly, the doctrine already pays lip service to the ideals of empiricism and
rulism. For example, the Second Restatement requires judges to consider the expectations of
the parties (an empirical question) and to decide cases in a way that promotes certainty,
predictability, uniformity of result, and ease of application (a nod toward rules).
Unfortunately, until recently, the development of the field has not reflected these goals.
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judges do with, and to, the law, but also in what the law does to the people
affected by it.
A. The Missing Cases
Judges have broad powers to manage and shape cases. Included among
these powers is the broad discretion they enjoy over whether and how to report
their opinions.35 Throughout the course of litigation, parties may file all kinds
of motions, some dispositive and some nondispositive, on which the judge will
rule, and the trial judge has a variety of options for how to handle any given
motion. She may rule orally or in writing, and, if she issues a written opinion,
she alone may decide whether to officially publish it or not. In making these
choices, we must imagine that the judge is likely to be influenced by a mix of
factors: her own judicial philosophy, her clerks’ advice, the parties’ needs,
interests, and positions, the specifics of the case, the specifics of the motion, the
importance of the subject matter, and court norms and rules, to name a few.
Surprisingly little research has been conducted that addresses the narrow
issue of how representative published opinions are, and what research exists
shows that the “differences between published and unpublished case decisions
should serve to remind us that in examining published cases alone, we are
investigating an unrepresentative subset of decisions which in turn may
seriously compromise the validity of conclusions regarding judicial
behavior.”36 Unpublished opinions may address issues that are as complex and
important as those found in published opinions,37 and they present district
judges with “potential law making opportunities in which their values could
shape the outcomes.”38
It is something of a disappointment, then, that Symeonides’s empirical
analysis is based entirely on published opinions. To make matters worse, he
purposely excludes from his study cases that have only “cursory” discussion of

35. See Karen Swenson, Federal District Court Judges and the Decision to Publish, 25
JUST. SYS. J. 121 (2004).
36. Evan J. Ringquist & Craig E. Emmert, Judicial Policymaking in Published and
Unpublished Decisions: The Case of Environmental Civil Litigation, 52 POL. RES. Q. 7, 33
(1999).
37. See Susan M. Olson, Studying Federal District Courts Through Published Cases:
A Research Note, 15 JUST. SYS. J. 782, 784 (1992) (“[P]ublished cases are neither a random
sample of all district court cases nor a comprehensive selection of the important ones.”);
Donald R. Songer, Nonpublication in the United States District Courts: Official Criteria
Versus Inferences from Appellate Review, 50 J. POL. 206, 213 (1988); see also Peter
Siegelman & John J. Donohue III, Studying the Iceberg from Its Tip: A Comparison of
Published and Unpublished Employment Discrimination Cases, 24 L. & SOC’Y REV. 1133,
1133-37 (1990).
38. Songer, supra note 37, at 213.
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a choice-of-law issue (p. 267). This decision makes little sense, for surely
litigants are equally affected by a choice-of-law decision regardless of the rigor
of the written opinion.
To put a fine point on it, it may be true that in forty-four out of fifty
published and “adequately reasoned” loss-distributing common-domicile
published cases, the courts chose the law of the common domicile; but how
many other cases, cursorily argued or unpublished or even unwritten, follow
this pattern, and how were those cases decided? In the end, we really only
know what some unspecified and perhaps unrepresentative sample of courts
have done, which is not at all the same as knowing what courts do. We are left
wondering what all of those other cases might reveal. Perhaps the unpublished
cases, which may be the vast majority, are the “easy” cases,39 and the published
cases may be the unrepresentative and aberrational ones. Thus, in fact, it could
be that the modern approaches work as intended in most cases, and the
revolution may have proven a success. Alternatively, the unpublished cases
may be particularly shoddily reasoned—and thus reveal that the flexibility of
the modern approaches invites arbitrary outcomes.
The real lesson here may be that although cross-sectional quantitative
analysis is among the most powerful tools available to legal scholars, it too has
significant limitations, chief among them the problem of data. One solution to
this problem might be to choose a small number of jurisdictions and collect all
decisions, reported and unreported, reflecting choice-of-law decisions. The
process would be painstaking, but it would offer some insight as to whether
published decisions reflect unpublished decisions. Additionally, one could
scour court records for motions raising choice-of-law questions and compare
them to the decisions rendered on those motions to determine whether those
decisions are generally published or not, whether they are written at all, and
how they respond to the motions. Finally, one could actually speak to attorneys
who regularly deal with conflicts issues and ask how courts deal with their
motions. Admittedly, these tools are less powerful than broad cross-sectional
quantitative analysis, and scholars have reason to distrust anecdotal research in
particular. But when data is simply not available, the ambitious scholar who
wishes to tell a complete story must find other ways to get at the problem.

39. Reynolds, supra note 8, at 1389 n.84 (“One always wonders at the validity of a
critique based only on a sample of reported opinions. The success of a system depends in
part on how it handles the easy, as well as the difficult, cases. By their very nature, however,
the former will not be published, and, therefore, not evaluated by scholars.”).
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B. The Missing Perspective
The question of the missing cases addressed in the previous section is best
thought of as one of depth: in trying to determine what judges do with the
doctrine, how much information does one need, and how does one get it? There
is a related and even more fundamental problem with Revolution, one that is
best conceived of as a question of breadth: in trying to determine the impact of
the revolution, where does one look? Symeonides has chosen to look only at
judicial opinions. But to truly provide a complete assessment of the revolution,
one would have to look far more broadly and consider its impact on lawyers,
litigants, and potential litigants.
The driving concern of the scholars and judges who shaped the revolution
was introducing rationality in the choice-of-law determination. They perceived
the rigid First Restatement to be arbitrary, for if the state in which the injury
occurs has no interest in the outcome, then why should its law govern? Hence,
we have the state-interest analysis. But they did not consider the potential cost
of flexibility. It should be uncontroversial and obvious that the introduction of
flexibility into any legal doctrine creates uncertainty. I say that it should be
uncontroversial and obvious because, for some reason, in conflicts scholarship
and jurisprudence, this point has been almost totally ignored.
Uncertainty has a price, and the price is borne by litigants and potential
litigants.40 After all, a conflicts question that has no clear answer is a conflicts
question that costs money and time to litigate. Everything in the case is up for
grabs: the decision of where to bring the lawsuit is driven by uncertain choiceof-law considerations; both sides must formulate a strategy that accounts for
both the substantive issues in the case and the conflicts questions; the value of
the case becomes less clear, making settlement negotiations more difficult; and,
of course, the case can stretch on, as the parties may have to await a choice-oflaw ruling before even reaching substantive issues.
These hard costs would be bad enough if they fell on all parties to litigation
equally. But they become far worse when we consider that they might not. The
cost of uncertainty might fall disproportionately in some cases on plaintiffs,41

40. See, e.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Legal Precedent: A Theoretical
and Empirical Analysis, 19 J.L. & ECON. 249, 272 (1976) (“[U]ncertainty will increase the
private costs of negotiating out-of-court settlements of disputes . . . because the outcome of
litigation over the meaning of the statute will be difficult to predict.”); see also Borchers,
supra note 9, at 510 (asking whether “conflicts cases [may be] needlessly harder to settle and
thus needlessly more expensive”).
41. Because tort plaintiffs often face greater financial pressure than do their
defendants, they tend to be more risk averse and therefore have a tendency to undersettle
their claims. The more uncertain their claims and the more drawn out the litigation, the more
acute these financial pressures may become. See Janice Toran, Settlement, Sanctions, and
Attorney Fees: Comparing English Payment into Court and Proposed Rule 68, 35 AM. U. L.
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and the modern choice-of-law approaches may therefore favor deep-pocketed
defendants. There could be a point at which attorneys, particularly those who
work for contingency fees, elect not to accept cases that raise complex and
unpredictable conflicts questions. Similarly, potential plaintiffs, when faced
with the uncertainty and costs associated with modern doctrine, may choose not
to litigate in the first place. These are hardly rational outcomes.
It is unfortunate that conflicts scholars tend to characterize the interests of
efficiency and predictability as something orthogonal to, or separate from,
fairness and rationality; in truth, they are core elements of fairness and
rationality. Therefore, perhaps the best approach would be a return to those
very rigid and dogmatic rules that predate the revolution.
All of this is speculative, of course, but that is the very point: it is
speculative because no one has bothered to inquire how the modern approach
impacts litigants. We have spent fifty-plus years looking at judicial opinions to
assess the costs of arbitrariness in choice-of-law judicial determination, and it
was these costs that spurred the revolution and all that has followed. But if we
look instead at the hard costs that the modern approaches have introduced and
the potential arbitrary results that these costs have imposed—that is, if we were
to fill in the other side of the ledger—we may feel altogether differently about
the revolution itself.
Thus, while Symeonides seeks to tell the story of the American choice-oflaw revolution, he makes the same mistake as the revolutionaries themselves:
the scholar reads judicial opinions, the judge reads law review articles, and no
one bothers to ask what is going on behind the scenes. We have no real sense of
what the impact of the revolution has been or what the balance between rules
and approaches should be.
CONCLUSION
Contrary to the opinion of many conflicts scholars, it is time for less
theorizing in choice of law, rather than more.42 Legal scholars must take more
seriously the impact of theory on practice. What we need, in a sense, is a real
restatement from practitioners—but not a prescriptive and normative
restatement of the ALI sort popularized by the realists; instead, a law-andsociety restatement that fills in the blanks and shows how choice of law
operates from the bottom up. It would be used not to tell judges what to do, but
rather to lay bare what judges and the law do. I can think of no better way to

REV. 301, 326-28 (1986).
42. See, e.g., Symeon C. Symeonides, American Choice of Law at the Dawn of the
21st Century, 37 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1, 6-7 (2001) (urging for more theoretical work in
conflicts scholarship).
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accomplish this than by building on the empirical work pioneered by
Symeonides and others and putting conflicts scholarship into contact with legal
practice. I mean this in the most literal sense: scholars should speak with
practitioners about the impact of theory and doctrine on real life cases and legal
practice.
To do this in a serious way is more easily said than done. Bearing in mind
that qualitative research does not carry the same weight as well-done
quantitative analysis and that “the plural of anecdote is not data,” the scholar
who undertakes this sort of research faces serious obstacles. Initially, one must
identify practitioners who have broad experience with choice-of-law questions.
These might include plaintiff-side product liability specialists, personal injury
attorneys, in-house counsel to manufacturers in specific industries, respected
defense firms that regularly deal with tort cases, and counsel to insurance
companies. Next, after identifying potential interview subjects, one must
convince them to participate in this kind of study while respecting attorneyclient privilege and general confidentiality issues.
But most important of all, one must decide what to ask practitioners.
Conceptually, there are two different themes that one would need to explore in
order to draw conclusions about the impact of the revolution on legal practice.
First, how do lawyers think about the law of choice of law? That is, how do
they understand and engage the doctrine? Symeonides and others have
suggested that attorneys are not skilled at working with the modern approaches,
and perhaps this is true. But perhaps they understand how to perform an
“interest analysis” as the doctrine calls, but choose not to for strategic reasons.
And if methodological soundness can be readily sacrificed at the altar of
strategy without anyone catching on, then there is a very real problem with the
methodology itself.
Second, and more important, how does choice of law shape legal practice?
This is a much broader and more open-ended theme, and it breaks down into
many other questions: Do the modern approaches help particular kinds of
clients, or hurt them? What has the revolution done to settlement positioning
and negotiation? How has it impacted the length of litigation and the choice of
whether to litigate? How do attorneys approach choice-of-law questions from a
strategic perspective? How often do attorneys encounter choice-of-law issues?
Exploring these themes in a systematic way will address the two primary
weaknesses of Revolution: the missing cases and the missing perspective.
Generally, it will help to build a far clearer picture of the revolution. More
practically, it will help scholars think about how the substantive doctrine should
develop and the procedural means by which it could do so, both very real
questions for conflicts scholars—and both questions that are dominated, in the
grand tradition of conflicts scholarship, by theory uninformed by practice.
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